

The Brattle Group

#### Rate Shock Mitigation NARUC Summer Conference San Francisco, CA

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- Breadth and underlying causes of the problem
- Zero-NPV Mitigation
- Preventing future shocks



# **Breadth and Causes of Problem**

- Underlying cost increases since 1/2000
  - Natural gas and spot coal both up ~100%
  - RTO costs for congestion, ancillaries, and market development
- Expiration of retail restructuring rate freezes (good news/bad news: we are having this problem now because we did not have it earlier)
- Some utilities financially constrained: 20% at credit rating below investment grade
- Future upward rate pressures due to needed infrastructure refurbishment and expansion, plus likely environmental costs.

# There is no "silver bullet" where the problem already has arisen.

- Best can do is zero-NPV repackaging of cost-recovery mechanisms
- However, this can result in lower rates, even over the long run

## **Possible repackagings:**

- Classic deferral phased-in rate increases, carrying charges on regulatory asset, amortization later
- Capital recovery levelization/financing sale and leaseback in large ratebase items, Trended Original Cost ratemaking
- Risk transfers to customers, e.g. AACs, CWIP

# **Deferral Themes and Variations**

- For deferral to be value-neutral, rather than expropriation, deferred amounts must be:
  - ► A credible regulatory asset account
  - ► Earning a fair carrying charge
  - Assured of being fully amortized
- Carrying cost on deferred amounts can be lower, the more secure their recovery

# **Capital Recovery Financing**

- Typical cost of service pricing creates "front-end loading" for large capital (ratebase) items
  - (r x Net Book Value) + Straight line depreciation
- Through sale-and-leaseback, carrying charges become more flat over lease life,
  - ▶ (lower r + deferred amortization) x Gross Book Value
  - ▶ Rates are lower, but PV is the same
    - Lower costs at lower discount rate = same PV
  - Lease payments must be highly assured (low risk to lessor)

# **Capital Recovery Rescheduling – TOC**

- Front-end loading may be inefficient and inequitable under some circumstances
  - In competitive markets, assets more typically grow in value with inflation, less obsolescence; economic depreciation generally back-end loaded
  - ► More like "replacement cost-new" appraisals
  - E.g., transmission assets probably worth much more today than when built, but cost-of-service rates may be much less
- Trended Original Cost (TOC) ratemaking can be used to rectify this, consistent with cost-of-service principles
  - ► Ratebase grows at inflation, less depreciation over remaining life
  - Return on ratebase excludes inflation
  - PV (net cash flows at WACC) = original cost
  - Used by Trans Alaska Pipeline for a portion of value

# **TOC vs. Conventional Ratemaking**

# There are many economically equivalent ways to recover costs, by varying how amortization and returns are scheduled.

**Comparison of Annual Capital Recovery** under three cost-based methods 250.0 Annual carrying charges for a \$1 Billion asset with a 30-year life and 10% WACC (Inflation = 3%: Real Return = 7%) 200.0 Level Real 150.0 \$Millions Trended OC 100.0 **Traditional OC** 50.0 0.0 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 Year

### Regulation, more so than the intrinsic operating risk of the underlying assets, determines the riskiness of utility equity (hence cost of capital):

- Total business risk is split between customers and shareholders; if not given to customers, then shareholders need a high CoC (and conversely)
- Risk allocated through price structure (fixed costs in variable charges), deferrals, estimated costs vs. actuals, unstable or inefficient subsidies, etc.
- More reliable, rapid matching of revenues to costs reduces investor risk; customer rates go down but customer risk goes up

# Given the volatility of the market outlook, and the need for expanded utility infrastructure, rate shock problems may recur.

#### Some preventive steps are feasible:

- Asset selection scale, type, timing
- Energy efficiency defer/avoid need
- Avoid transition-creating prices
  - Automatic adjustment clauses
  - CWIP in ratebase
  - Staggered procurements
  - Safety values force majeure clauses for rate caps during rate freezes

# **Prevention – Asset Selection**

- All utilities and their commissions strive to find least-cost plans, but these may still result in severe rate shock:
  - E.g. if chosen assets have low PVRRs because of very distant cost advantages
  - Or if asset advantages are heavily dependent on a few key scenarios occurring
- Smaller assets may have NPV advantages not captured in typical PVRR analysis, due to value of flexibility (optionality)
- High long-run uncertainty may also justify:
  - Shorter evaluation period
  - Bigger payback from front-end loaded assets
  - Technological obsolescence penalty
- Diversification is <u>not</u> necessarily helpful to rate shock

# **Prevention – Energy Efficiency**

- A big driver of potential future rate increases is CO<sub>2</sub> policy
  - A \$10/ton CO<sub>2</sub> penalty raises an efficient baseload coal plant's operating costs by roughly \$10/MWh, a gas CC by \$4/MWh
  - A broad CO<sub>2</sub> tax will raise costs of service and wholesale market prices significantly – <u>as is desired</u>, in order to discourage fossil fuel usage and attract non-carbon technologies and energy efficiency
- Energy efficiency may be the best possible response costeffective, some low-hanging fruit, saves money and carbon

### If utility rates and revenues stay fairly closely in phase with costs, the potential need for large, abrupt adjustments (rate shocks) goes down.

- Same total costs involved
- Customers may be more tolerant of predictable, gradual increases than of abrupt, large adjustments after years of cost protection
- Gradual increases may be more efficient and equitable: costs borne by those who benefited
- Mechanisms include automatic adjustment clauses (AACs) allowing CWIP in ratebase, PBR/incentive ratemaking

Rate shock is an easier problem to prevent than to cure (though not fully preventable).

# Solutions should be value-neutral (0 NPV), but still can yield reduced rates

- In the short run: deferrals
- Or the long run: if risks to investors reduced

# Some solutions may be more efficient and equitable than status quo

- Back-end loading
- Effective and broad AACs